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Summary findings
Beck describes and evaluates the deposit insurance  In Germany's highly concentrated commercial banking
scheme set up by private conimercial banks in Germany  sector, the small number of banks facilitates a club
in 1975. The scheme's funding and management are  atmosphere and quick resolution of banking crises. But it
completely private, with no public supervision. Where  could also prevent the entry of new, innovative market
other schemes rely on monitoring  by depositors to  participants, so that the club becomes a cartel.
decrease moral hazard problems, the German scheme  Germany's anti-bankruptcy bias might help prevent
relies on peer monitoring by its member banks. The  moral hazard but can also stifle entrepreneurship. There
system has weathered several small bank crises but has  is a tradeoff between the efficiency gain of a privately
not yet been exposed to a major bank failure or a  run deposit insurance scheme andl  its potentially negative
systemic crisis.  impact on competition and entrepreneurship.
To what extent can it serve as a model for other  Although the scheme cannot easily be transplanted  to
countries?  developing countries, it offers lessons for other
The success of thie  German scheme has to be judged  economies. Schemes  with a clublike character reinforce
against an institutional environment that fosters contract  peer monitoring and minimize the risk of free riding.
enforcement and the rule of law and discourages  Risk-based premiums based on auditing by the deposit
corruption.  In a country with weaker institutions, the  insurance scheme create a healthy link between the
voluntary membership might quickly lead to adverse  protection an insurance offers and the moral hazard it
selection, with strong banks leaving the scheme. The high  aims to prevent. One compromise might be a
coverage limit might induce bank managers and owners  combination of ex ante funding that guarantees
to abuse the scheme. Banks might intentionally  credibility with depositors and ex post bank funding that
underfund the scheme, counting on additional  gives banks an incentive to monitor one another to
government resources in times of crisis. And the secrecy  minimize costs.
of funds might decrease fund managers' accountability in
societies with little transparency and much corruption.
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The last two decades have seen a rise in explicit deposit insurance schemes
around the world.  While in 1980 only 16 countries had explicit deposit insurance
schemes, by 1999 68 countries had established one (Garcia, 1999; Demirgui,-Kunt and
Sobaci, 2000).  While the Bretton Woods institutions have in most cases supported the
establishment of explicit insurance schemes, the wisdom of this policy has recently been
questioned.  Demirgui,-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) show that countries with an explicit
deposit insurance scheme are more likely to have a systemic banking crisis and are more
vulnerable to systemic risk factors than countries without such a scheme. Demirgiiu-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find that the adoption of an explicit deposit insurance scheme
undermines market discipline exercised by creditors and depositors on banks.  Recently,
the attention has shifted from the establishment of an explicit deposit insurance scheme to
institutional details, such as coverage, membership, funding and management.
Demirguic-Kunt  and Detragiache (2000) show that the coverage and funding of deposit
insurance schemes have a significant impact on the probability with which a country
suffers a banking crisis.  Demirgiiu-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) show that the coverage and
funding are important determinants of the degree of  market discipline exercised by
depositors vis-a-vis banks.  The importance of the design of the deposit insurance
schemes thus increases the need to study institutional details of individual schemes.
This paper describes and analyzes the deposit insurance scheme established by the
German Bank Association in 1975. While cross-country comparisons of deposit
insurance schemes provide valuable insights into the effects of an explicit insurance
scheme and its institutional features on market discipline and moral hazard, they
necessarily have to abstract from the richness of institutional details that the study of
individual schemes can offer.  By focusing on the institutional details of the German
deposit insurance scheme, this paper is therefore complementary to cross-country work.
The German deposit insurance scheme for private banks stands out among other
explicit insurance schemes. Being a voluntary scheme, it is privately managed and funded
and is outside any governmental supervision.  It does, however, cooperate with public
authorities in the auditing and licensing of banks and in crisis resolution.  Although it
offers almost unlimited coverage, depositors do not have a statutory right of
1reimbursement. While depositors do not have any incentives to exercise market
discipline, the private nature of the scheme and the almost unlimited coverage seem to
promote peer monitoring and thus market discipline exercised by the member banks.
Over the 25 years of its existence it has weathered several smaller bank crises, but has not
been exposed to a major bank failure or systemic crisis yet.
The German deposit insurance scheme is an example of a private-public
partnership, with the private component taking the first losses, up to an unspecified level.
Only in the case of a systemic crisis and if losses are beyond the private insurer's
capacity the government is assumed to interfere, a case that has not happened yet in
Germany.
We will assess the German deposit insurance scheme on the background of its
unique characteristics, the structure of the German banking sector, other components of
the financial safety net and the institutional environment in Germany. As shown by
Demirgiiu-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), the effectiveness of a deposit insurance scheme
in reducing moral hazard increases in the quality of the institutional environment of a
country. The other elements of the financial safety net also have an important impact on
the efficiency of the deposit insurance scheme.  Finally, we will evaluate to which extent
this scheme can serve as an example for other countries that either want to set up a new
scheme or want to reform an existing one.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some
theoretical and empirical findings on the optimal structure of a deposit insurance scheme.
Section 3 describes the main features of the German banking system to the extent that
they are relevant for our discussion.  Section 4 describes the deposit insurance scheme for
private banks and otnier  elements of the German financial safety net. Section 5 evaluates
this scheme on the background of the principles laid out in section 2 and other Germany-
specific factors.  Section 6 briefly describes the changes introduced by the European
Union and section 7 concludes.
22. Principles  of Deposit  Insurance 1
Deposit insurance schemes as part of the financial safety net have two conflicting
objectives: on the one hand, they want to protect small depositors and ensure financial
stability, on the other hand, they want to minimize banks' incentives to take aggressive
risks.  While establishing a deposit insurance scheme can be an optimal policy to promote
bank stability by preventing bank runs, it can also be a source of moral hazard if banks
can transfer the down-side risk of their business to the owners of the deposit insurance
scheme, often the tax-payer. Rather than promoting bank stability, this actually increases
bank fragility.
The trade-off between the objectives of stability and minimizing moral hazard can
also be understood by analyzing the interests of the four different groups of agents
involved in deposit insurance schemes: depositors, banks, scheme managers and scheme
owners.  While depositors value the supposedly higher safety of their deposits and might
therefore reduce their effort of monitoring banks, for banks' owners and managers the
existence and features of a deposit insurance scheme change their incentive structure by
minimizing the down-side risk of the bank business. But there might also be conflicts
between strong and weak banks.  If strong banks have to subsidize weak banks via flat
premium rates, they will leave a voluntary deposit insurance scheme.  The resulting
adverse selection increases the problems of moral hazard even further. Scheme owners
want to minimize the costs of the scheme, while the scheme managers might have
personal interests, such as their professional career, or might represent the interests of
other groups, such as politicians or the banks. 2 These agency problems might result in an
inefficient safety net.
There are several features to make an explicit deposit insurance incentive
compatible and thus decrease moral hazard, adverse selection and agency problems. On
the one side, one can assign a margin of loss to private parties to force them to monitor
banks and, so increase market discipline. The objective is to identify a group that is best
able and most likely to exert market discipline when forced to do so. A limit to the
coverage makes the insurance incomplete, and forces especially large depositors to
' This section draws heavily on Kane (2000) and Calomiris (1997).
2 This is also referred to as regulatory or political capture.
3monitor banks.  Coinsurance forces all depositors to bear a certain share of losses, since
they are reimbursed for less than 100% of their deposits.  Excluding interbank deposits
from the insurance forces banks to monitor each other and exert market discipline.
Excluding foreign currency deposits also makes the coverage less complete, thus
increasing depositors'  margin of loss.  Excluding insider accounts, i.e. the deposits of
management and influential owners, reduces moral hazard by making owners and
managers participate personally in the down-side risk of the bank business. One can also
make shareholders more accountable by making them liable for losses beyond the level
of the paid-in capital.  This would make stock prices more sensitive to changes in
underlying bank fundamentals and have shareholders participate more fully in the down-
side risk.  Finally, through subordinated debt a class of debt holders can be created that
would take the first hit.  The holders of subordinated debt would therefore have a strong
incentive to monitor banks and exercise market discipline.
On the other side, one can design the management and funding of the scheme in a
incentive compatible way. Adverse selection can be decreased by making the scheme
compulsory and by introducing risk-adjusted premiums.  To decrease the agency
problems between owners and managers of the deposit insurance scheme, private funding
and management have been proposed. However, a complete privatization might not be
possible, since the government and thus the tax payer is always expected to step in,
especially in a catastrophic case.
Recent empirical research has shown that the coverage and the funding of a
deposit insurance scheme are important features that determine its success in terms of
preventing bank runs and providing small depositor protection, while maintaining market
discipline and avoiding aggressive risk taking by banks that would result in banking
crises. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find that higher explicit coverage and
having a funded scheme reduce market discipline, i.e. the sensitivity of the deposit
interest rate the bank has to pay to changes in profits and liquidity ratios.  Demirgiiu-Kunt
and Detragiache (2000) likewise find that the probability of having a banking crisis
increases in the coverage limit and in having a funded scheme.
Empirical research by Demirgtiy-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) has also shown the
importance of the institutional environment for the success of a deposit insurance
4scheme. Using indicators of the institutional quality of a country, such as the rule of law
or a corruption index, as proxies for the quality of prudential regulation and supervision,
the authors find that in countries with more efficient institutions the moral hazard
problems stemming from explicit deposit insurance and some of its characteristics are
lower or non-existent. T his raises the importance of country-specific approaches to
deposit insurance schemes, taking into account other elements of the safety niet  and the
institutional environrnent.
A deposit insurance scheme has to be assessed in the context of the complete
financial safety net, with prudential regulation and supervision, lender-of-last-resort
facilities and bank insolvency resolution procedures being the other main elements of the
safety net.  An insurance scheme without the appropriate instruments to monitor and
police banks through prudenitial  regulation and supervision to thus replace the missing
market discipline can result in banks taking excessive risks, thus abusing the safety net.
The absence of an effective lender-of-last-resort  that can provide immediate liquidity to
sound banks, undermines the safety net's function of preventing bank runs.  The lack of
prompt action in the case of failing institutions, a quick exit-strategy and clear and
transparent resolution procedures encourages owners and managers of insolvent banks to
take additional risks of which they only bear the up-side risk, thus increasing the risk of
bank fragility and therefore the strains that are put on the deposit insurance scheme. But it
is not only the effectiveness of each component of the financial safety net that is
important, but also the cooperation between the different actors. While concentrating all
four elements in one agency might lead to conflicts of interest, a close cooperation and
information sharing is important.
3. The German  Banking  System
The German banking system is characterized by a large share of public and
cooperaLive  banks. 3 As can be seen from Table 1, commercial banks make up only
around 25% of total banking assets and deposits. Public banks, owned either by the
counties and cities or by the states (Lander) make up the relative largest part of the
3See  Baums (1994) for an overview of the German banking system.
5banking sector, both in terms of assets and in terms of deposits. Cooperative banks,
finally, are the third largest group of the German banking system. Table 2 shows that
relative to other countries in both the European Union and the whole OECD, Germany
has a relatively large share of public banks.
Table 1: Deposit and asset shares of different bank groups in Germany, 1999
Total assets  Total nonbank deposits
Commercial banks  25.2%  24.6%
Of which: largest four banks  14.4%  12.8%
Savings banks  36.1%  39.4%
Cooperative banks  13%  18.7%
Other banks  25.7%  17.2%
Source: Bundesbank Monthly Report February 2000. Other banks include mortgage banks, building and
loan associations and banks with special functions
Table 2: Share of public banks: Germany and other countries
Share of public bank assets
Germany  36.4%
European Union  25%
OECD  28.1%
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000).  The share of public banks is defined as the
percentage of assets of the 10 largest banks in each country owned by the government divided by the total
assets of these banks in 1995.
The commercial bank sector is heavily concentrated, with the four largest banks
representing more than half of total assets and deposits of all commercial banks. 4 While
these four and other commercial banks are active in all German states, there are a large
number of regionally concentrated commercial banks.  Finally, there are still a small
number of private bankers who are liable for the banks' losses not only with their paid-in
capital, but also with their personal assets. 5 The commercial banking sector thus shows a
relatively inhomogeneous structure.
4 These are Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank, and Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank.
5Many  of these "private bankers", however, have been taken over by one of the large four and, although
operating under their original name, are not private banks anymore.
6The savings and cooperative bank sector, on the other hand, is highly
fractionalized, mostly along geographic lines. 6 Savings banks are restricted to the area of
the city or county that owns it. Most of these banks were founded in the 1 8th and 19th
century to provide a safe outlet for the savings of the lower and middle classes.  While
originally following very conservative asset policies, they now resemble commercial
banks.  While geographically restricted, they are linked to regional banks that provide
banking services that the local banks are not able to provide, such as international
banking and securities business.  Similarly, cooperative banks operate in geographically
restricted areas. These cooperatives were founded in the 19th century to serve rural areas,
but also small and medium entrepreneurs in urban areas. 7 Originally restricted to serving
only their members, they have opened up in recent decades.  While members had initially
mutual and indefinite liability for their cooperative, this has since then be restricted and
in most cases liability is now reduced to the paid-in capital. As the savings banks, the
cooperative banks have access to the services provided by regional and national apex
banks.
Due to the geographic concentration of savings and cooperative banks,
competition between the different groups of banks is much greater than between
members of each group.  While each group initially concentrated on different lines of
business, commercial, savings and cooperative banks have become more alike in recent
years.  While savings and cooperative banks are not necessarily profit maximizing
institutions, due to their ownership structure, the commercial banks cannot be assumed to
be shareholder-value maximizing either.  The large commercial banks vote a large part of
the votes at their respective shareholder meetings themselves (Gottschalk 1988).8
Furthermore, there is cross-ownership of commercial banks.9
6 The average  size of a commercial  bank  balance  sheet  was 4 990  million  Euro, as of December  1999,
whereas  it was 1 601  million  Euro for saving  banks  (excluding  the large  regional  Land  banks) and only  263
million  Euro for cooperative  banks.  Source:  Deutsche  Bundesbank  (2000a).
7 See Bonus  and Schmidt  (1990)  for an excellent  description  of the cooperative  banking  group  in Germany.
s According  to Gottschalk  (1988),  Deutsche  Bank  voted 47%,  Dresdner  Bank 47% and Commerzbank  35%
of the votes at the respective  Shareholder  meetings.
9 According  to Gottschalk  (1988),  Deutsche  and Dresdner  Bank  voted  25% of all votes  at the Commercial
Bank shareholder  meeting,  Deutsche  and Commerzbank  voted 17%  of all votes at the Dresdner  Bank
Shareholder  meeting  and Dresdner  and Commerzbank  voted 13%  of all votes at the Deutsche  Bank
shareholder  meeting.
7German banks have traditionally been universal banks, engaging in both
commercial and investment banking and serving both households and firms. Furthermore,
German banks, especially commercial banks, have relatively close links with the
corporate sector; German banks control large parts of shares in major industrial
companies and have representatives on most supervisory boards."'
4. The German Deposit  Insurance  System
4.1. General characteristics of the German deposit insurance schemes
While some regional deposit insurance schemes had existed since the 1950s, it
was not until the Herstatt crisis of 1974 that the three major deposit insurance schemes in
Germany were set up. I  I  Since the early 1  960s political pressure to introduce a deposit
insurance scheme for all financial institutions increased. After the Herstatt crisis, finally,
the three banking groups introduced their respective schemes to avoid government
intervention that might have gone beyond the introduction of a general deposit insurance
scheme.  At the same time the Liquidity Consortium Bank was founded to provide
liquidity support to solvent but temporarily illiquid banks.  The introduction of private
and voluntary deposit insurance schemes by the different banking groups can thus be
explained as the result of political pressure and the attempt to avoid further government
involvement in the financial sector.
Each of the three main German bank groups has its own deposit insurance
scheme.  The insurance scheme for the private banks - which is the focus of this paper -
was established by the German Bank Association to offset the competitive advantage that
the savings banks had due to their public ownership.  The savings bank group has several
'° According  to different  studies,  quoted  by Kester  (1994),  German  banks  own 9%  of listed  German
companies,  but more  than 25% of the 33 major industrial  corporations.  Furthermore,  banks  also  act as
depositories  for stock owned  by individual  stockholders.  In 1988,  banks  represented  40% of the total
market  value of outstanding  shares,  so  that they effectively  controlled  nearly  50% of all shares. While
Gordon  and Schmid  (2000)  report somewhat  lower  numbers,  they  note that  corporate  equity  ownership  is
concentrated  in the big banks  and that  for most corporations  it is concentrated  in one bank. They  also  quote
a study  that German  banks  were represented  on two  thirds  of the supervisory  boards  in 1979,  accounting
for 10%  of all members..  See also  Allen and Gale  (1994).
l l For a historical  overview  see Zimmer  (1992).  For a general  overview  of the different  deposit  insurance
schemes  in Germany,  see Bundesbank  (1992).
8regional deposit insurance schemes and a national compensation scheme. Although the
depositors of savings banks are protected by an explicit institutional guarantee of the
public owners, the savings banks were pressured into establishing insurance schemes to
offset the competitive disadvantage of private banks. As the savings banks, the
cooperative bank group has both regional and national insurance schemes. The schemes
of both savings and cooperative banks do not directly guarantee deposits, but rather the
institutions themselves.
All three bank groups have their own auditing entities and work closely with the
Federal Banking Supervisory Office and the Bundesbank.  The Bundesbank is prohibited
by law to act as a lender of last resort for the deposit insurance schemes. It is rather
expected that in the case of a systemic crisis, a political solution will be found, without
this case being predictable (Bundesbank, 1992). All three schemes are voluntary and are
financed by premium rates levied on member banks.
42.  The  Deposit  Insurance  Scheme  of the Private  German  Banks
In the following we will describe briefly the most important characteristics of the
scheme. Table 3 compares these characteristics with other deposit insurance schemes
around the world.
Membership: The membership in the deposit insurance scheme is voluntary, but
compulsory for all members of the German Bank Association, unless they belong to
another deposit insurance scheme. Although membership is voluntary, non-participating
banks face high barriers.12 The Federal Banking Supervisory Office is required, under
section 32(3) of the Banking Act, to consult the appropriate banking association before
granting a license.  The bank association therefore has a consultative role in the licensing
process and is able to point out facts about the applicant bank that might prevent it from
participating in the deposit insurance scheme.  Both members and non-members of the
12 There  are different  reports  about  the numbers  of banks  that  do not belong  to the scheme.  Dreher  (1998)
reports 5, while Steuer (1998) reports 36 out of 300 banks.
9deposit insurance scheme have to inform their depositors about the extent to which
deposits are covered.'3
Comparing the German deposit insurance scheme to other countries, we note that
it is one of few that are not compulsory. Demirguic  -Kunt and Sobaci (2000) report 13
countries with voluntary schemes, as opposed to 55 with compulsory schemes. In Europe,
only Macedonia and Switzerland have voluntary schemes.
Coverage: All nonbank deposits are covered up to a limit of 30% of the liable
capital of the troubled institution. Given that the minimum capital for a bank according to
the Banking Act is 5 million Euro, the minimum limit is 1.5 million Euro, or around 50
times per capita income of Germany. Given that the average equity size of a commercial
bank is 295.5 million Euro, the average limit is around 90 million Euro.'4 These very
high limits make the coverage almost complete.  The protection is granted to both
domestic and foreign depositors and irrespective of the currency in which the deposits are
denominated. The scheme covers both domestic and foreign branches of its member
banks.  There is no co-insurance. Not protected are interbank accounts, bonds payable to
bearer and insider accounts.  But although there is nearly complete coverage, there is no
statutory right, neither for depositors to be reimbursed, nor for the banks to be helped in
the case of a crisis.  While no bank has been refused help and no depositor has been
refused reimburseLient  5, this seems to leave a degree of uncertainty in the system.
The coverage in the German scheme is the highest world-wide, both in absolute
terms and compared on a deposit per capita basis. (Demirguic-Kunt  and Sobaci, 2000)
The average coverage limit is three times per capita GDP across explicit schemes.
Financing: Like the deposit insurance schemes for savings and cooperative banks,
the scheme for the private banks is financed exclusively by the member banks and on a
mixed ex-ante and ex-post basis. Member banks have to pay a premium of 0.03% of
"liabilities to other creditors arising from banking business" every year.  This premium
can be doubled or set at zero if there are esteemed to be sufficient funds. There can also
be an extraordinary premium of up to 100% of a regular premium in case the funds are
"  See Banking Act, Section 23a.  In the case of non-member banks this coverage extends only to deposits
up to 20,000 Euros, with a co-insurance of 10%. See section 6 for details.
14 Source for these data is Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report February 2000.
i5 See Zimmer (1992).
10not sufficient.  There is a one time additional payment of 0.09% for new members.
Banks that have paid for more than 20 years and are classified in the lowest risk category
(A), can be exempted from premium payment. Banks that are classified as higher risks
(B or C), are required to pay an additional premium of up to 250% of the regular
premium.16 The insurance scheme does not publish financial statements so that the
available funds are not publicly known.
There is no public funding. The Bundesbank is prevented by the Bundesbank Act
to function as lender of last resort for the deposit insurance schemes. However, it is
conjectured, that the private banks' deposit insurance scheme might not have sufficient
funds to reimburse depositors in the case of a systemic banking crisis or a major bank
failure.  In this case, and only in this case, it is expected that the government will step in,
without this case being predictable (Bundesbank, 1992).
Worldwide only 10 countries have unfunded deposit insurance schemes, most of
them European.  Most countries are at least partially funded by premiums levied on
member banks, but most receive additional government resources or can expect to
receive them in the case of a major crisis. 21 countries have risk-adjusted premiums
(Demirguc1-Kunt  and Sobaci, 2000).
Management: The deposit insurance scheme is organized within the German Bank
Association and is thus under the management and by-laws of this private association.
There is no public supervision.1 7 The scheme is managed by a commission of 10 bank
representatives that are accountable to the general assembly of the Association. All
groups of commercial banks are represented in the commission.'8 The scheme is flexible
in terms of how it assists a troubled bank.  It can reimburse depositors directly or it can
pay to the bank itself. It can issue guarantees or assume liabilities of the bank in trouble.
Only 11 countries have deposit insurance schemes that are completely managed
privately.  Apart from Tanzania, Argentina and Brazil, all countries are in Europe. Most
deposit insurance schemes are administered either jointly or publicly.
16 The risk classification and the differentiation of risk premium was introduced in 1997.
17 Since the scheme does not offer a statutory right to depositors, it does not fall under public regulation
(Steuer, 1998).
18  According to the statutes, there are four representatives of the large banks, three representatives of
private bankers and three representatives of regional, foreign and other banks.
11Auditing: All member banks have to be member of the Auditing Association of
German Banks, that audits all member banks on a regular basis, both off- and on-site.' 9
The Auditing Association is closely linked with the deposit insurance scheme; its
advisory board and the deposit insurance committee have identical membership.  The
Auditing Association of German Banks can impose corrective actions on member banks
if there are circumstances that increase the riskiness of the bank's business or other
circumstances that violate the Banking Act or other laws referring to bank business.
These actions can include restrictions on the volume of deposit business or certain types
of lending.  Since 1997 the Auditing Association also classifies banks on a yearly basis.
The possible grades (A, B, C1, C2 and C3) are confidential and cannot be used by banks
in advertising.  As mentioned above, banks classified as B or C are assessed additional
premiums of up to 250%  of the original premium. Classification criteria are the financial
situation and the quality of the management information and controlling systems of the
bank.
Members can be expelled from the scheme, especially in cases of missing or
wrong information, and in case that the bank is classified as C3 for more than two years
in a row.  20 Member banks can be expelled by a vote of the commission of the scheme, a
decision that can be overturned only by a two third majority of the general assembly of
the association.  If a dominating share of a bank's capital is purchased by someone who
does not fulfill the requirements of the statutes concerning trustfulness, the exclusion is
automatic.
19 See Auditing Association of Gernan  Banks (1999).
20 No bank, however, has been expelled so far.
12Table 3: Characteristics of the private German deposit insurance, compared to
other countries
Germany  EU 21 US  World average
Explicit  Yes  Yes  Yes  68 countries
Coverage limit  30% of equity  20 000 ECU  100 000 USD  On average three times
per capita GDP
Coinsurance  No  10%  No  17 out of 68 countries
have co-insurance
Foreign Currency  Yes  Can be  Yes  Covered in 48 out of
Deposits Covered?  excluded  68 countries
Interbank Deposits  No  No  Yes  Covered in 18 out of
Covered?  68 countries
Funding  Funded, but  Not  Funded  58 out of 68 countries
additional  regulated  have funded schemes
funds callable
Source of Funding  Banks only  Not  Joint  Private: 15
regulated  Joint: 51
Public: 1
Management  Private  Not  Public  Private: 11
regulated  Joint: 24
Public: 33
Membership  Voluntary  Compulsory  Compulsory  Compulsory in 55 out
of 68 countries
Risk Adjusted Premiums  Yes  Not  Yes  21 out of 68 countries
regulated  have risk-adjusted
premiurns
Sources: Demirgiiu-Kunt and Sobaci (2000), Bundesverband deutscher Banken (1999).
21 Minimum  requirements  according  to EU directive  94/19
134.3. Other  Elements  of the German  Financial  Safety  Net
As mentioned in section 2, the functioning of a deposit insurance scheme has to
be evaluated in the context of the complete financial safety net.  Compared to other
countries, the German financial safety net relies heavily on personal coordination and
cooperation between the banking sector and public authorities. This becomes especially
apparent in the case of crises, as described below.  The German financial safety net also
relies on market discipline, as illustrated by the Herstatt Bank crisis in 1974, when
creditors were not compensated by the authorities.
The Federal Banking Supervisory Office (FBSO) is responsible for licensing,
regulating and supervising banks. It closely cooperates with the Bundesbank. 22 There is
also a fairly close cooperation between the FBSO and the deposit insurance schemes. As
mentioned above, the FBSO has to consult the Bank Association before granting a bank
license. The Bank Association and the Auditing Association have to submit all auditing
reports to the FBSO and the Bundesbank (Banking Act, Section 26).
The FBSO has wide ranging powers. It can demand the dismissal of any bank
manager that "has intentionally or recklessly contravened the provisions of the (Banking)
Act ... " (Section 36).  The FBSO can impose corrective actions on a bank if it is found in
violation of any regulatory norm, such as inadequate capital or liquidity (Sections 11 and
45).  It can temporarily close a bank or revoke the bank's license if regulations of the
Banking Act have been violated or in the case of large or continuous losses (Sections 35
and 46). If the FBSO revokes a license, the bank is liquidated by a liquidator appointed
by the court of registration.  The revoke of a license is immediate; any appeal against the
revoking of the license does not have postponing effect.
Unlike in other countries, the Bundesbank (or now the European Central Bank)
does not fulfill the function of a lender of last resort for banks.  This function is rather
assumed by a private liquidity supplier, the Liquidity Consortium Bank (LCB), set up in
1974 on initiative by the Bundesbank. Its objective is to ensure the due settlement of
domestic and external payments through banks by granting short-term liquidity to sound
22 Among  the  areas  of cooperation  listed  in the  Banking  Act  are  the  exchange  of information  and  the
participation of the president of the FBSO in meetings of the Bundesbank Council on issues relevant to
bank supervision.  Furthernore,  the Bundesbank  participates  actively  in the drafting  and issuance  of bank
regulations and bank inspections.  See Deutsche Bundesbank (2000c) for more details.
14banks that are facing temporary liquidity problems. 23 Shareholders are the Bundesbank
with 30% and major banks with 70%.24 Its paid-in capital is DM 372 million, with
callable capital of DM 1,860 million.  The LCB has also access to a re-discount line at
the Bundesbank of DM 1,1  00 million. Loans are approved by a loan committee,
consisting of bank representatives and are granted at market rates and against collateral.
4.4. Past  Experience  of the Private  Deposit  Insurance  Scheme
The deposit insurance scheme has had to reimburse in 26 cases so far (Steuer,
1998). In most cases, the deposit insurance scheme steps in after a bank has been
temporarily closed and is in process of being liquidated, and the accounts are transferred
to another financial institution. The decision to which bank to transfer or whether to pay
out depositors directly is made by the deposit insurance scheme on a cost basis.  The
largest cases so far have been Schroder, Miinchmeyer, Hengst and Co. (SMH) in 1983
25 and Fischerbank in 1995.  In the first case, it had to pay out 345 million DM to
reimburse depositors and creditors and in the latter case it had to pay for 80 000 accounts
and 1.6 billion DM deposits. 26 All bank crises have been solved and paid for exclusively
by the private deposit insurance scheme without any public money.
The failure of SMH is a case that shows how the "club" of private German banks
works in corporation with public officials in the case of an individual bank failure, in
order to minimize the impact on the banking system quickly. 27 In November 1983, SMH,
a small private bank, faced DM 900 million, a third of its assets, and eight times its
equity, in losses from non-performing loans to a holding of construction firms. Under
pressure from the Bundesbank and the Federal Banking Supervisory Office, banks with
outstanding claims on SMH agreed on converting their claims into subordinated debt, in
exchange for managerial control. The deposit insurance scheme put up DM 345 million
to pay out depositors and foreign creditors. 28 The new owners then appointed a new
supervisory board.  A month later, the bank was split into a good and a bad bank, with the
23 This resembles  the  role  of clearing  houses  in the  U.S.  in the 19'h  and  early  20th century.
24 Commercial,  savings  and  cooperative  banks  participate  in the  LCB.
25 While SMH was a private partnership, Fischerbank was a regional bank.
26  See Steuer (1998).
27  See Grant (1984), Shireff(1985)  and Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1990).
28  The deposit insurance scheme raised the premiums for 1983 and 84 to 0.06% to cover the SMH losses.
See Delamaide (1984).
15good bank being sold to Lloyds Bank and the bad bank taken over by the German Bank
Association and subsequently being liquidated. Interestingly enough, the problems at
SMH were discovered by the Bank Association, not by the Supervisory Office. Although
government representatives were present and exercised some pressure at the first
meetings, the crisis resolution was purely private.  The German Bank Association was at
the center of the rescue.  The decisions on how to resolve the crisis were taken within
hours at the Bundesbank in Frankfurt with the creditors taking over SMH within days.
5. The German Deposit Insurance Scheme - A Model?
Although the deposit insurance scheme for private bank does not seem to fit
perfectly the best-practice scheme, as laid out in section 2, it seems to have worked very
well over the last 25 years. While the scheme does not provide any incentives for
depositors to monitor banks and thus exercise market discipline, the completely private
nature of the scheme seems to provide sufficient incentives for banks to monitor each
other.  Monitoring by depositors and creditors is thus replaced by peer monitoring.
Cooperation between public authorities and the private scheme, the institutional
framework and an anti-bankruptcy bias are additional determinants of the "success" of
the German deposit insurance scheme.  In the following we discuss each of these
determiinants in turn.
5.1. Peer Monitoring  Instead  of Depositor  Monitoring
German banks take very low risks, compared to other countries, and do not seem
to take advantage of an implicit subsidy extended to them by the financial safety net, as
shown in a recent paper by Laeven (2000).  Hle  analyzes the risk-taking of banks in 12
countries by calculating the gross subsidy extended to banks by the safety net.  This gross
subsidy is measured by the fair premium that banks would have to pay for deposit
insurance.  Measured by this gross subsidy, German banks take by far the lowest risk
arnong the 12 countries.29 By subtracting the premiums banks have to pay from the gross
subsidy, one can calculate the net subsidy extended by an explicit deposit insurance
16scheme. For most years in the 90s, German banks paid premiums that were higher than
the gross subsidy, i.e. there was a negative subsidy or tax imposed by the deposit
insurance scheme.
Several features of the German deposit insurance scheme are not incentive
compatible and seem to decrease, if not eliminate market discipline exercised by
depositors.  The nearly unlimited coverage, the lack of coinsurance, the broad coverage
of accounts, both in domestic and foreign currency, and both at home and abroad, are all
disincentives for depositors to monitor banks carefully. The lack of a statutory right for
depositors and the lack of information about accumulated funds of the scheme, on the
other hand, might off-set these negative effects, at least partially.  But the fact that the
scheme has reimbursed all depositors so far, and that depositors seem to perceive an
implicit deposit insurance for large banks, whose failure might lie beyond the financial
resources of the scheme, renders these characteristics meaningless.  Since the design of
the deposit insurance does not give any incentives to depositors to exercise market
discipline vis-A-vis  banks, there must be other elements that explain the lack of moral
hazard and aggressive risk-taking by banks.
Monitoring by peer banks replaces monitoring by depositors in the German
banking sector. This is accomplished by (i) the completely private nature of funding and
management of the scheme, (ii) the exclusion of interbank deposits from the insurance,
and (iii) the almost complete coverage of deposits.  The scheme is outside any public
regulation and supervision, although it fulfills some public functions, as for example in
the licensing process.  The fact that interbank deposits are excluded increases the
incentives for banks to monitor each other. Finally, the almost complete coverage that
depositors enjoy and that eliminates market discipline by depositors, might in turn
increase market discipline exercised by the banks.  Given the complete private nature of
the scheme and the lack of public back-up funding, the member banks are not able to
externalize any costs stemming from a distressed member bank.  The almost complete
coverage therefore increases pressure on the member banks to monitor each other.
29 The other countries in the sample are France, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore,
Taiwan, Thailand, UK and US.
17The deposit insurance scheme is completely integrated in the structure of the
German Bank Association.  It therefore resembles a club that provides a non-rival, but
excludable good for its members. 30 But unlike most clubs that provide rival and
excludable goods, the deposit insurance scheme is not necessarily subject to problems of
congestion.  On the contrary, a larger number of banks allows better risk diversification
and enables mutual monitoring.  There might be a point, though, where adding more
banks might decrease the efficiency of mutual monitoring, since with a higher number of
banks the intensity of business between two given banks decreases and the risk of free
riding increases. 31 The high concentration in the private German banking sector might
therefore result in an optimal size for such as a club, balancing effectively the trade-off
between risk diversification and intensity of inter-bank monitoring.  Having separate
deposit insurance schemes for each group of banks (public, cooperative and private)
reinforces the private club nature of the deposit insurance schemes by aligning the
interests of individual banks more closely.
The completely private nature of the scheme also avoids agency problems - often
found with deposit insurance schemes - between owners of the scheme, its managers and
banks, since these three groups coincide in the German case. Unlike in other countries,
the tax payer is not the owner of the scheme and thus not directly involved in the scheme.
This eliminates potential agency problems between public administrators of the scheme
and the tax payers as owners. It also eliminates the risks of regulatory and political
capture (Garcia, 1999). Since the deposit insurance scheme is completely embedded in
the German Bank Association, no agency problems between scheme managers and banks
arise.
The complete integration of the scheme in the bank association also reduces the
problem of adverse selection that arises from a voluntary scheme.  The dominant position
of the German Bank Association prevents the exit of member banks (Zimmer, 1992).
Although problems of adverse selection and moral hazard remain within this club, the
30 In the literature a club is defined as "a voluntary group of individuals who derive mutual benefits from
sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members'  characteristics or a good
characterized by excludable benefits" (Comes and Sandler, 1996, p.347). All three characteristics apply to
the private German banks: they produce jointly the good "insurance", they belong to the same group of
banks and deposit insurance is an excludable, though non-rival good.
18small number of members, the common ownership structure (private), the common goals
and professional ethics create a sense of community. Personal contacts facilitate moral
suasion and pressure.  Furthermore, to minimize problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard within this club, the deposit insurance scheme has supervisory and regulatory
powers over its members.  It has the power to impose corrective actions on member
banks that do not comply with regulatory or prudential standards and can even expel
members if they do not comply with these.  Problems of adverse selection within the
scheme are avoided by a rather equal representation of the different groups of banks on
the commission. None of the three groups (large banks, private bankers, and regional,
foreign and other banks) can impose itself on the other two groups.
Another element of the success of the German deposit insurance scheme seems to
be the close cooperation between public authorities responsible for prudential regulation
and supervision and the private banks, its association and the deposit insurance scheme.
This becomes manifest in the resolution of banking crises, as in the case of the SMH
failure described above. However, the prompt coordination of industry support for a
failing bank is made possible only by the high degree of market concentration in the
German private banking sector, which in turn, can be explained by the absence of any
branching restrictions and the universal banking system. 32
Conflicts of interests between the lender of last resort and the deposit insurance
scheme are reduced by the existence of a private liquidity supplier, the LCB, owned and
managed by the private banks and responsible for liquidity support to healthy banks.  The
LCB does not have incentives to lend to failing banks, since the costs of this action have
to be borne by the deposit insurance scheme, also run and financed by banks.
Furthermore, the close link between the deposit insurance scheme and the LCB increases
the pressure on banks to belong to this club.
The German deposit insurance scheme resembles in its structure the successful
deposit insurance schemes in the U.S. during the 19th  and 20th century, notably the
National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) and a number of schemes in the
3'  See also  Calomiris  (1989) for a description  of this trade-off  in the case  of deposit  insurance  schemes  in
the U.S.
32  See also Roth (1994).
19antebellum period. 33 The successful examples of the past functioned also like clubs, had
strong regulatory and supervisory powers over their members and exit from the scheme
was hard or even impossible.  Furthermore, there were other advantages in belonging to
the "club" such as liquidity support.  in times of crisis. A small number of members and
unlimited mutual liability prevented free riding on the collective insurance.  Members of
the NCUSIF are atso liable without limit for any shortage in the fund and have therefore
strong incentives to monitor each other.
5.2. Other Institutional, Legal and Economic Determinants of Banking
Stability in Germany
The success of the German insurance scheme has to be evaluated on the
background of the institutional framework. While Demirgti-Kunt  and Detragiache
(2000) show that an explicit deposit insurance and a higher coverage limit increase the
probability of a crisis, this effect turns insignificant in countries with very high levels of
institutional quality. Sinice  Germany scores very high on all of these indicators, it is not
surprising that the existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme with an extremely
high coverage limit does n3ot  increase moral hazard in Germany as much as in other
countries.
The success of the German deposit insurance scheme can at least partly be
explained by a certain anti-bankruptcy bias in Germany. Bankruptcy is viewed as
personal rather than as economic failure.  Furthermore, bankruptcy can result in criminal
persecution, as the case of Graf von Galen in the SMH failure shows.  What is considered
a white-collar crime in other countries and often either inot  a criminal act or if it is, not
enforced, is taken very seriously in Germany. 34 According to the German criminal law
bankruptcy can be punished with a prison sentence of up to five years if caused by -
arnong others - accounting fraud, hiding assets or actions that are counter to "orderly
3  For a description  of successful  and failed  deposit  insurance  schemes  in the U.S.  see Calomiris  (1989,
1990) and English (1993). For a description of the NCUSIF see Kane and Hendershott (1996).
34 The treatment of Graf von Galen raised eyebrows in other countries. Euromoney described his trial as
"witch-hunt". Graf von Galen was sentenced to three years and nine months in prison, for breach of trust, a
criminal offense in Germany, but not in the U.S. or the U.K. See Shireff(1986). Hans Gerling, the main
owner of Herstatt bank, agreed to contribute nearly DM 150 million out of his personal assets to reimburse
creditors in order to avoid being sued by them over the bankruptcy of Herstatt (Economist, 1974).
20business practices".  In aggravated cases bankruptcy can be punished with up to 1O  years
in prison.  A bankruptcy is considered aggravated when the accused has acted criminally
out of greed or endangers knowingly by his bankruptcy the wealth of persons who have
entrusted him their wealth. 3 5 According to legal scholars, the lacter  is the case for
financial institutions (Liedtke, 1995). Beyond the criminal persecution, the German
Banking Act prohibits a manager who has been involved in a fraudulent bankruptcy to
ever take a managerial position in the banking sector again.36
While the private nature of the deposit insurance scheme and the anti-bankruptcy
bias in laws and economic life prevents bankers from taking excessive risks and might
reduce moral hazard, it might also have a negative impact on entrepreneurship and the
competitive structure of the banking sector. A strong anti-bankruptcy bias can be
detrimental for risk-taking and innovation.  Finally, the dominant position of the banking
association can transform this club very easily into a cartel that tries to impede entry by
new members and therefore stifle competition in the banking sector (Zimmer, 1992).
Entry barriers imposed by the Bank Association are higher than the requirements for a
banking license as spelled out in the Banking Act, and put a high emphasis on hard to
define concepts, such as "trustfulness" and "orderly business practices". 37
Finally, the ownership structure of the German financial sector might be another
determinant of the banking stability. As described above, large parts of the banking
sector are either in public or cooperative ownership, and are therefore not profit-
maximizing entities.  Most of the commercial banks seem more under the control of their
management than shareholders, as described in section 3.  While this lack of shareholder-
value maximization might decrease efficiency in the banking sector, it might also help
reduce aggressive risk taking and moral hazard.  The oligopolistic market structure within
the commercial banking sector and the resulting high franchise values of banks might
further diminish incentives to "bet the bank."
35German  Criminal  Law  Art. 283  and 283a.
36  Banking Act, Sections 32 (1), 33 (1) and 35(2).
37 There  have been several  cases of banks  which  have been  refused  membership  in  the deposit  insurance
scheme  -, so e.g. the  BVH Bank fir  Vermogensanlagen und Handel. This bank was closed in 1997 after
extensive losses. See Seuthe (1999).
216. The New European  Directive
The European Union adopted in 1994 - against the vote of Germany - a mandate
to establish compulsory deposit insurance schemes in all member countries.  The
coverage limit of these schemes has to be at least 20 000 Euro, and a coinsurance of up to
10% is allowed.  The organizational structure of these schemes is left to the countries. 38
Germany complied by this mandate by establishing insurance schemes that offer
the minimum protection as demanded by the EU mandate.39,40  Apart from a low coverage
limit and the 10% coinsurance, accounts of public entities, of insiders and any financial
institution -including  insurance companies and mutual funds - are excluded.  Both
schemes - one for private banks and one for public banks that are not part of one of the
institutional insurance schemes - are privately managed, but under the regulation and
supervision of the Federal Banking Supervisory Office. The scheme for the private banks
is managed by the German Bank Association, but separately from the private voluntary
deposit insurance scheme.  The schemes are to be financed by annual premiums from the
member banks, with the premiums being set by the Ministry of Finance. The privately
managed deposit insurance scheme continues in its present form, since it does not fall
under public regulation and therefore not under EU Law.  However, it is now responsible
only for deposits over 20,000 Euro and deposits not covered under the basic compulsory
insurance. The Auditing Association of Gernan  Banks will not only continue auditing
members of the voluntary scheme, but also of the new compulsory scheme.
Germany has thus fit the new compulsory scheme into the existing structure. The
new compulsory schemes have adopted several of the features of the voluntary scheme -
private management and financing, and a close link between insurance and auditing.
38 For an overview over the implementation of the compulsory deposit insurance in Germany see Deutsche
Bundesbank  (2000b).
39  Since reimbursement of deposits and claims from investments are separate, the coverage limit can be up
to 40 000  Euros.
40  "Entschadigungseinrichtung deutscher Banken" and "Entschadigungseinrichtung des Bundesverbands
Offentlicher  Banken Deutschlands".
227. The German  Private  Deposit  Insurance  Scheme  - What  Can
We Learn?
The German example shows that a deposit insurance scheme that is funded and
administered completely by banks is feasible in a specific institutional and competitive
environment. The club nature of the scheme, the auditing and supervisory  power of the
deposit insurance scheme, and the close cooperation between public authorities and the
private scheme have contributed heavily to the success of the German scheme and have
off-set other incentive-incompatible  elements of the scheme, such as the high coverage
limit. The lack of incentives for depositors to exercise market discipline has been off-set
by monitoring by the banks themselves. The reason that depositors do not have
incentives to monitor banks - the almost complete coverage - increases the incentives for
banks to exercise market discipline since they - and only they - have to bear the costs of
distressed banks.  It is thus the interaction of different design elements rather than the
simple sum of incentive compatible features that matters for the success of a deposit
insurance scheme in increasing market discipline and reducing moral hazard.
The German deposit insurance scheme is a successful, though untested, example
of a public-private partnership in the regulation of the financial sector. The private
parties involved have to take any losses, which enhances incentives to monitor each other
efficiently. Not only have losses to be covered by previously paid premiums, but the
banks can be assessed additional premiums. The government is by law prohibited to get
financially involved in bank failure resolution. One can only conjecture that when the
burden is turning too heavy and when the losses imposed on the member banks become a
threat for the health of the whole financial sector, the government comes in, without this
case being predictable. One can define this private-public  partnership also along the
dimension of systemic and non-systemic crises. The private partner has to take all losses
incurred due to non-systemic crises, whereas the public might step in in the case of a
systemic crisis.
But the success of the German scheme has to be judged on the background of an
institutional environment that fosters contract enforcement and the rule of law and that
exhibits a minimum level of corruption. In an environment with lower institutional
quality, the voluntary membership might very quickly lead to adverse selection, with
23strong banks leaving the scheme. A high coverage limit might induce bank managers and
owners to abuse the scheme, expecting that they will be able to externalize the costs of
failed banks.  In a weak institutional environment, an only partially funded scheme might
result in banks underfunding the scheme intentionally, counting on additional
government resources in times of crises. While the secrecy of available funds might
strengthen depositors'  confidence in Germany, it might decrease accountability of the
fund managers in a society with low degrees of transparency and high levels of
corruption.
The success of the German scheme has also to be judged on the background of the
market structure of the German banking system. A highly concentrated commercial
banking sector with a small number of banks facilitates a club atmosphere and the quick
resolution of a banking crisis as in the case of SMH. However, it might also prevent the
entry of new and innovative market participants and transform the club into a cartel.  The
economic and legal anti-bankruptcy bias in Germany might be helpful to avoid moral
hazard, but can stifle entrepreneurship. A more general assessment therefore has to
consider carefully the trade-off between the efficiency gain of a privately run deposit
insurance scheme as in Germany and its potentially negative impact on competition and
entrepreneurship.
For many developing countries that are in the process of establishing or redefining
their deposit insurance scheme Germany might be a model to be considered. Many
emerging economies'  financial systems are characterized by concentrated banking sectors
with a small number of institutions and a large share of state-owned banks.  A deposit
insurance scheme limited to the private banks and managed and owned by the banks
themselves might increase accountability, reduce moral hazard and foster the
development of the private banking sector.  While other elements of the German
"success" story might:  be missing - such as the institutional environment and a anti-
bankruptcy bias -, a private deposit insurance scheme as in Germany might be an
important first step towards more banking sector stability. A privately managed and
funded deposit insurance scheme can serve as the first line of defense to ensure financial
stability, if equipped with the right incentive structure and a certain degree of supervisory
and regulatory power.
24But even if the scheme as a whole cannot be easily transplanted to other countries,
there are still several lessons to be learned, especially for developing countries.  First,
creating several schemes for different groups of banks, such as private, cooperative and
government owned banks, increases the "club" character, reinforces peer monitoring and
minimizes the risk of free riding. Second, risk-based premiums based on auditing by the
deposit insurance scheme create a healthy link between the protection an insurance offers
and the moral hazard it wants to avoid. Finally, a combination of ex-ante funding that
guarantees credibility of the scheme vis-a-vis depositors, and ex-post funding by banks
that constitutes an incentive for the latter to monitor each other to thus minimize costs,
might be a recommendable compromise.
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